Why Signal Calls Google


I just started my de-googling journey recently, and so the mechanics of notifications were still unclear to me, and I found this video super helpful.

It explains how most mobile messaging apps (including privacy-focused ones like Signal) rely on Google and Apple's centralized servers to deliver push notifications, which exposes vast amounts of user metadata.

Here's the YT link, for people who prefer it:
youtu.be/c3ennD3wKn0

in reply to 45o3b
This is the reason why I went out of my way to use Molly (a fork of Signal), since it supports delivering the push notifications through a self-hosted server instead. Unfortunately the process is complex: it requires both a method to deliver the notifications to your phone via UnifiedPush (an alternative to Google's push system that generally suffices on its own) and a compatibility service called MollySocket (that bridges Signal's notifications with the UnifiedPush provider). Both typically need a self-hosted server and specific configuration to talk to each other though. And I don't even have any contacts that use Signal anymore, so, well...!

DeGoogle Yourself reshared this.

in reply to Carlos Solís

You can use push providers if you trust them. For example mozilla hosts one.

The MollySocket service also does not need and does not have decryption keys, only keys to request encrypted messages from signal servers. Still not something I would want to run on someone elses server without serious privacy considerations.

in reply to 45o3b

That is correct.

However, this is a quasi-monopoly by google having quietly overwhelmed the space. Same thing for RCS messaging.

Neither push notifications nor RCS are proprietary, so there is a possibility to tear oneself from google here.

For instance, there are several free and paid push notifications services. Pushbullet is a popular paid one, not too expensive. I personally use ntfy.sh/, which can be self-hosted.

RCS is different because trusting the encryption keys makes RCS work, so there would have to be a critical mass of buy-in to use an alternative to google's RCS implementation.

in reply to Voxel
RCS is off-topic.


Disagree, it serves to illustrate the same kind of monopoly google has one push notifications.

UnifiedPush is not a push service, it is a distributor. It is a proxy for push services, it does not send out its own notifications.

Also, ntfy does not need to use unified push, it simply makes put or post notifications, like it does in the self-hosted version. For instance, I do not want my http push notifications flying around in plain text with notifications about my private services being up or down, so I don't use one. I arrange the connectivity to my applications myself.

Here again, google has done us all a disservice by obscuring the difference.

Esta entrada fue editada (domingo, 7 de junio de 2026, 20:02)
in reply to 45o3b

From what I recall, Google would be able to see our device received a notification and when but not the actual message nor sender/recipient identity.

I think that's fine for my threat model.

Molly seems like a potential alternative though since its a signal fork and supports UnifiedPush so you can choose a different notification supplier like ntfy or sunup

Esta entrada fue editada (lunes, 8 de junio de 2026, 2:24)
in reply to 45o3b
The video correctly identifies that push notification reliance forces even privacy-centric apps to hand over metadata to platform providers. This creates a fundamental tension where true end-to-end encryption for metadata often requires trusting the device's OS vendor or accepting a third-party notification service, which is why many users now prefer self-hosted or desktop-only solutions to avoid this specific tracking vector.