Meta Muse appears to read your Apple messages and upload them to the cloud even if you explicitly tell it not to:

appleinsider.com/articles/26/09/28/metas-new-ai-agent-blatantly-ignores-users-permissions

in reply to evacide

I love the sea 😄

Unfortunately it looks like people are very much divided (again🙄): Some try to take care of their own and others privacy, some go like "it's all too much, it's useless anyway what I do. And I guess, bc everybody is doing it, using Meta and Co can't be that bad anyway..." 🙄

Edward Snowden keeps waving...

Esta entrada fue editada (ayer, 19:55)
in reply to Piotr Gaczkowski

“Friends don‘t let friends use Signal, or other inaccessible messengers from the life unworthy of life camp”, is more important than ever, too. Unless you are in the Binding & Hoche camp, well naturally. For their protection and for their protection. Hmmkay.


so "Friends don't let friends use Meta" is getting more important than ever. For our protection and for their protection.

in reply to evacide

the only defensible conclusion: Meta delenda est.

But more constructively, as a public it seems we need stronger data privacy laws. GDPR but with more bite. Meta is the poster child why we cannot trust them to regulate themselves.

For those come in clutching pearls about how this will break silicon valley as a growth engine... that's kind of the genesis of our problem - the bargain "let us do what we want, and we will all get rich" never quite materialized nor was the consent universal.

in reply to evacide
A question I had a few months ago that I found no answers to - Whatsapp pushes you to turn on local storage, and to configure that to be pushed to Google cloud. It also advertises "end to end encryption", which I take to mean the communication part, not the backup part. Are those backups encrypted in such a way that Google and/or Meta cannot read them?
in reply to Gabriel N
Short answer: WhatsApp's E2EE protects message content in transit, but that's only one layer. Metadata (who, when, frequency) goes to Meta regardless, and message content is only as private as the device it lands on — cloud backups, linked devices, and forensic extraction all bypass E2EE entirely. The harder question is whether any mainstream messenger survives the 'phone itself is the target' threat model.
in reply to evacide

They don't go into full forensic to explain this:

He had not given Muse permission to access Messages, and full disk access was not enabled. It just went ahead and uploaded those texts anyway.


Currently, the only way to "gate" genAI is to explicitly deny access. This article implies that permission was never granted, but somehow it did it anyway?

That should be the headline.

Where did the permission come from?